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PREFACE 
The following preliminary calculations are part of a larger effort of IIASA's 
Population Program to review the state of interdisciplinary thinking today concerning 
future trends in fertility, mortality, and migration in the main regions of the world. 
Alternative views about future trends are then numerically translated into a larger 
number of scenarios of population changes up to the year 2050 and in some cases 2100. 
A book has recently been published on the more developed countries (Future 
Demographic Trends in Europe and North America: What Can We Assume Today? edited 
by W. Lutz, Academic Press, 1991); another book is under preparation on Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. Finally, this work will also result in a summary paper on alternative 
paths of future world population growth. 
Responding to an immediate demand by scientists involved in the analysis of 
global environmental change, the following paper gives some very preliminary 
calculations for scenarios that are not yet based on a thorough scientific analysis of 
assumptions as described above. The alternative assumptions made are very simple. In 
formulating them we tried to abstract as much as possible from mainstream demographic 
thinking. Although few demographers would dare to specify a constant rate scenario 
resulting in further exponential growth of the world population, to many non- 
demographers this seems to be the most natural point of reference. Except for the Third 
World Crisis Scenario the assumptions made do not consider a possible influence of high 
growth rates on mortality rates. 
Despite all shortcomings, this preliminary set of scenarios may be useful for 
putting the often-mentioned figure of an ultimate stationary world population of about 
10 billion into perspective. The calculations also demonstrate clearly that a success in 
curbing population growth would inevitably result in an extreme aging of the population. 
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ABSTRACT 
For six major regions of the world, ten alternative scenarios on future fertility and 
mortality trends are defined and projections performed from the base year 1985 up to 
the year 2100. Because of the great inertia of population changes, for the next 20-30 
years the scenarios based on widely diverging assumptions do not produce very different 
patterns. In the longer run, however, the assumption of constant fertility and mortality 
rates resulting in continued exponential growth yields a total population size of 15 billion 
in 2050 and even 39 billion in 2100. The immediate replacement fertility scenario, on the 
other hand, would result in 7.5 billion by 2050. This still means an addition of more than 
two billion people to today's population of 5.3, which is entirely due to the momentum 
of population growth. Another major finding is that further aging of the population 
structure is inevitable even under constant rates. In the case of successful curbing of 
population growth, aging would be extremely rapid. For example, in Africa under the 
immediate replacement scenario the mean age of the population would increase from 
presently 22.2 years to more than 40 years by 2050. More moderate scenarios also result 
in very significant aging. 
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SCENARIOS FOR THE WORLD POPULATION IN THE NEXT 
CENTURY: EXCESSIVE GROWTH OR EXTREME AGING 
Wolfgang Lutz and Christopher Prinz 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Changes in population size and age structure have great inertia. Unless wars, 
famines, or epidemics kill significant proportions of the population, or massive migratory 
streams empty some regions and fill others, the future population of a certain region can 
be projected with high certainty in the short run. If one also assumes that fertility only 
varies within a rather narrow range, projections for the next 20-30 years are very reliable 
and insensitive to minor changes in mortality, migration, and fertility. Most of the 
change in size and age structure is already pre-programmed in the population's present 
age structure. In the following scenario calculations we will see that even widely 
differing assumptions will yield almost identical results up to the year 2010-2020. 
Thereafter, the range of possible futures opens widely. 
It also is the inertia of population changes that in the long run results in a great 
impact of only minor differences in assumed fertility trends over the coming decades. 
To take an extreme example from the following calculations: Whether a certain low 
fertility level in Africa will be reached by 2025 or 2050 will make a difference in total 
population size by the year 2100 of more than 1.5 billion, which is almost three times 
Africa's present population size. This incredible inertia that makes it such a difficult and 
long term issue to stop population growth is also called the momentum of population 
growth, the fact that the age structure of a fast growing population is so young that even 
if fertility per woman declined to a very low level, the increasing number of young 
women entering reproductive age will cause the population to grow further for quite 
some time. 
The usual approach to population projections, as practiced by most national 
statistical offices and the UN, is to calculate some (mostly three) variants based on given 
combinations of assumed fertility, mortality, and migration assumptions. The 
assumptions involved are generally not very obvious for the users. Usually the high and 
low variants differ from the medium variant only by the assumed levels of fertility. The 
time horizon of these projections tends to be 2025-2030. The appearing range between 
the low and high variant is often mistakenly interpreted as a confidence interval, 
although the assumptions on which they are based are more or less arbitrary. 
Aside from the United Nations (1991), on a global scale the World Bank (Vu, 
1985) regularly prepares population projections for all countries and regions. For them 
the time horizon is much longer, but only one variant is given. Generally, it is assumed 
that in every country fertility will reach replacement level in a certain year (e.g. 2010 in 
Brazil). After that year all rates are kept constant and projections are done up to the 
year in which the population will become stationary, i.e. stop to grow due to the 
momentum of growth (2155 in Brazil). That stationary population size is then used as 
the ultimate size of a country's population. This method was used in the 1985 World 
Bank Projections resulting in a world population of 10.4 billion in 2100. There are no 
alternative variants given by the World Bank. 
The scenario approach chosen for this short paper will also calculate the implica- 
tion of several alternative future paths of fertility and mortality that need not necessarily 
reflect our present main stream thinking. Some scenarios look at the consequences of 
possible discontinuities in past observed trends; others just caution the general belief that 
fertility will soon enter a steep decline in many less developed regions, especially in 
Africa. The value of such a scenario approach lies only to a lesser extent in the 
possibility for everyone to choose one's own favorite scenario and look at its long term 
implications. The main value of such a set of alternative scenario projections that are 
based on controversial but informed guesses about the future, lies in giving a picture of 
the possible range of future population sizes and structures. This will help to distinguish 
almost inevitable trends from changes that are very sensitive to slight modifications in 
the assumption. Given in reasonable regional detail such data should prove useful for 
studying the necessary resilience of ecosystems to alternative demographic futures. 
2. DEFINITION OF SCENARIOS 
For the purpose of this paper six regions of the world were defined and projected 
separately. They largely correspond to the regions used by the UN Population Division. 
This is convenient because size and age structure of the populations in the starting year 
are taken from the UN. At a later point more attention will be given to the definition 
of regions. For this paper they are: Africa, Latin America, Eastern Asia (China, etc.), 
Southern Asia (India, etc.), Other Asia (Arabic-speaking countries, Indonesia, etc.) and 
Oceania, and finally Europe/North America/USSR. This definition of regions should 
not be considered a final one, as it turned out to be difficult to find a distribution that 
matches all reasonable demographic, geographic, environmental, political and also 
statistical criteria. 
The following 10 scenarios are defined in Table 1. A Constant Rates Scenario 
(1) keeps fertility and mortality rates constant at their 1985-1990 level. This scenario 
probably does not meet the criterion of being possible because in some regions, 
especially in Africa, it is difficult to imagine how a population which is many times that 
of today could survive. If fertility will not decrease significantly we would almost 
inevitably have to expect an increase of mortality. On the other hand one could argue 
that Africa still has huge agricultural potential and, that under high standards of 
agricultural technology and social organization, it could be theoretically possible to 
provide a livelihood for many more people. In terms of Malthusian thinking this scenario 
assumes the absence of both a positive check (through higher mortality) and a preventive 
check (fertility decline). The only way such developments could be achieved in historical 
Europe was through technological progress. It is very doubtful, however, whether any 
such progress could be strong enough to feed more than ten times the Africans of today. 
The second factor that makes a continuity of constant rates unlikely for the more distant 
future is the hypothesis of demographic transition, which says that a fertility decline 
follows the mortality decline with some lag for adjustment of social norms. It is unclear 
how long this lag will last, but empirical evidence shows that this seems to be a universal 
tendency. 
The second scenario considered corresponds to the UN Medium Variant 
projection (2). Since these assumptions only go to the year 2025, rates are kept constant 
at their 2025 levels for the rest of the next century. The UN Medium Variant 
assumptions may be regarded as rather optimistic, because--with the exception of Africa-- 
they assume fertility to reach replacement level everywhere within only 35 years. Life 
expectancy is assumed to increase by around 10 years until 2025, distributed over the 
regions from only 5 years for women in the industrialized world to more than 15 years 
for women in Southern Asia, thus resulting in a convergence in life expectancy in the 
long run. These assumed strong increases in Third World life expectancy do not consider 
possible new threats ranging from AIDS in Africa to famines or environmental 
catastrophes. 
Table 1. Assumptions of 10 scenarios. 
Fertility Mortality 
No. Scenario (TFR) (Life exp.) 
1 Constant Rates const. const. 
2 UN Medium Variant UN med UN med 
3 Constant Fertility const. UN med 
4 Slow Fertility Decline UN med, delayed UN med 
5 Rapid Fertility Decline 1.4 in 2025 UN med 
6 Immediate Replacement Fertility 2.1 in 1990 UN med 
7 Constant Mortality 2.1 in 2025 const. 
8 Slow Mortality Decline 2.1 in 2025 UN med, delayed 
9 Rapid Mortality Decline 2.1 in 2025 85/80 in 2025 
10 Third World Crisis 
a. Africa/Southern Asia const. -10% 
b. Other Regions 2.1 in 2025 UN med 
More for demonstration than for serious consideration in the long run, the 
Constant Fertility Scenario (3) assumes an even more extreme case than the Constant 
Rates Scenario with birth rates constant at their present level but mortality improving 
according to the UN Scenario described above. Such a situation had been observed in 
parts of Africa in the recent past but is almost impossible to continue forever for the 
reasons described above. 
In the Slow Fertility Decline Scenario (4) fertility is assumed to decline to the UN 
Medium Variant level within 60 years instead of 35 years. Hence, this scenario is less 
optimistic than Scenario 2, since fertility rates close to replacement level are reached in 
2050 instead of 2025. Mortality assumptions are identical to Scenario 2. 
As another extreme, the Rapid Fertility Decline Scenario (5) investigates the 
population growth and structure we could expect in the case where current very low 
Western European fertility levels--with an average number of 1.4 children per woman-- 
would be reached all over the world by 2025. Fertility declines linearly between today 
and the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 1.4 in 2025, and again the life expectancy of 
Scenario 2 is assumed. Thus, it corresponds to a situation with completed demographic 
transition in every region of our globe. This scenario, which does not seem very likely at 
first sight, would reflect a situation of very high social and economic development in all 
parts of the world. With constant mortality, a TFR of 1.4 implies that each subsequent 
generation is diminished by one-third. Hence, in the long run the total population size 
should be declining. 
For a better understanding of the extent of the momentum of population growth, 
the Immediate Replacement Fertility Scenario (6) finally makes the highly unlikely 
assumption that replacement fertility (a TFR of 2.1) is immediately reached in all parts 
of the world. This is combined with the mortality assumption of Scenario 2. The extent 
of the momentum of population growth could also be derived analytically (Keyfitz, 1977, 
pp. 155-157). In the case of the initial age distribution being stable, the formula is very 
simple. In the empirical case of past changes in fertility and mortality patterns, a 
projection has the advantage of being able to compare population sizes at every point 
in time. 
The following four scenarios which consider different future trends in mortality 
will all have the assumption of replacement level fertility in all regions by the year 2025. 
This is not done because it was considered the most likely fertility assumption, but for 
simplicity. In analogy to Scenario 3, the Constant Mortality Scenario (7) reflects a 
situation of completed fertility transition in 2025 (i.e. replacement fertility everywhere) 
together with a stagnation in life expectancy at current levels. This stagnation might 
have several reasons ranging from new spreads of infectious diseases to nutritional 
deficits or environmental degradation. In the Slow Mortality Decline Scenario (8) 
mortality is assumed to decline as in the UN Medium Variant but with a slower path of 
improvement. UN mortality levels are reached in 2050 instead of 2025. The other 
extreme is represented by a Rapid Mortality Decline Scenario (9). Here it is assumed 
that life expectancy at birth will reach 85 years for women and 80 years for men in 2025. 
Again, linear paths of improvements and no differences between regions are assumed. 
Finally, one scenario was designed where assumptions differ strongly by region. 
The so-called Third World Crisis Scenario (10) defines the future 'Third World" being 
Africa and Southern Asia only. Hence, the scenario assumes that these two regions will 
not manage their population growth problem and a positive Malthusian check will 
increase mortality levels. In those two regions the crisis is defined as an increase in 
mortality (about 10% decline in life expectancy) together with continued high fertility 
(i.e. constant fertility rates). The rest of the world is assumed to complete the 
demographic transition by at least 2025, that is fertility reaches replacement level and 
mortality improves as in Scenario 2. 
Of course an unlimited number of different scenarios could be defined here 
especially when one assumes diverging demographic trends in the more distant future as 
is done in the last scenario. Furthermore the above given scenario definitions do not 
consider the possibilities of massive migratory streams from one region to another. In the 
final version of this paper a larger number of scenarios with more differentiated 
assumptions will be defined and calculated. Here the above given ten definitions should 
suffice to give a crude first impression of the consequences of the alternative 
assumptions. 
Table 2 gives figures on fertility and life expectancy for the regions considered, 
both for the starting year of our projections (1985) and for the year 2025 as assumed in 
the UN Medium Variant. Today, fertility ranges from a Total Fertility Rate of 1.97 in 
the region Europe/North America/USSR to 6.24 in Africa. Life expectancy ranges from 
50.3 years for men in Africa to 77 years for women in Europe et al. These sharp 
differences are supposed to converge steadily, reducing the TFR gap from 4.27 in 1985 
to only 1.24 in 2025, and the maximum difference in life expectancies from 26.7 years in 
1985 to 18.2 years in 2025. 
Table 2. Fertility and mortality by region (UN Medium Variant). 
Total fertility rate Life expectancy 
Women Men 
1985 2025 1985 2025 1985 2025 
Africa 6.24 3.04 53.6 67.4 50.3 63.7 
Latin America 3.55 2.39 69.5 76.3 64.0 70.3 
Eastern Asia 2.36 1.80 72.3 79.5 68.7 75.1 
Southern Asia 4.70 2.16 56.9 72.2 56.7 68.9 
Other Asia/ 3.92 2.20 64.0 74.9 60.4 71.0 
Oceania 
Europe/USSR/ 1.97 1.94 77.0 8 1.9 69.4 75.6 
North America 
3. SHORT SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
3.1. Total Sizes of World Population 
At the starting year of our projections, our planet accommodated around five 
billion people. Under all scenarios considered over the next 30-40 years, the world 
population will increase to a size of at least about 8 billion (see Figure 1). Even 
immediate replacement fertility in all parts of the world would result in an additional two 
billion or more people, due only to the momentum of population growth. Also under the 
rapid fertility decline scenario, assuming only two-thirds of replacement by 2025, the total 
population size would peak in 2040 at around 8 billion and only decline thereafter. 
Scenario 1: Constant Rates Scenario 6: Immediate Replacement Fertility 
Scenario 2: UN Medium Variant Scenario 7: Constant Mortality 
Scenario 3: Constant Fertility Scenario 8: Slow Mortality Decline 
Scenario 4: Slow Fertility Decline Scenario 9: Rapid Mortality Decline 
Scenario 5: Rapid Fertility Decline Scenario 10: Third World Crisis 
Figure 1. Total projected world population 1990-2100 according to scenario. 
Hence we may conclude on the lower side of the spectrum that, unless completely 
unexpected major threats to life kill great proportions of the world population over the 
coming 30-40 years, the world will have to accommodate an extra number of people that 
are at least as large as half of the world population today. Under the assumption of 
sustained sub-replacement fertility in all regions of the world the population might then 
decline again in the very long run and possibly by the year 2100 reach a size that is lower 
than that of today. But still in the transition period the 8 billion mark will be touched. 
On the higher end of the spectrum of possible future population sizes according 
to the scenarios defined here we have to distinguish between the three scenarios that 
look at the case of continued growth and those assuming a levelling off. 
Obviously exponential growth cannot continue forever and therefore in the longer 
run is not only unrealistic but also impossible. Nevertheless, it is instructive to study the 
results especially in the short to medium term future, and compare them to other 
scenarios. Furthermore, an assumed continuation of currently observed levels is in almost 
every scientific discipline a standard for comparison unless there is certainty that this 
level will change in one specific direction. In the case of population growth we have good 
reason to assume a change in rates, but we are far from any certainty about the extent 
and the timing of this decline. In any case, because of the inertia, over the coming three 
decades the Constant Rates Scenario (1) will not result in very different total population 
sizes than most other scenarios. Around 2015 the 8 billion would be reached and 10 
billion only after 2025. Under this scenario a world population of 15 billion would first 
appear after 2050. Under Scenario 3, assuming constant fertility and improving life 
expectancy, greater than exponential growth would result in even 17 billion by 2050. For 
the second half of the next century continued exponential growth would lead to ever 
increasing absolute increments resulting, under Scenario 1, in about 40 billion in the year 
2100. Further continuation of this growth would then soon result in "standing place only" 
situation. By definition, these exponential scenarios do not assume a feedback from 
population size to fertility or mortality. 
For the scenarios assuming a decline of fertility to replacement level at some 
point in the future, it appears that even relatively small differences in assumptions 
concerning the timing of fertility decline have a major impact on population size. 
Projecting UN Medium Variant assumptions up to the year 2100 gives a levelling off in 
population growth at around 11 billion, the population size in 2050 already being 10 
billions (Scenario 2). Delaying the fertility decline by 25 years, Scenario 4 gives a 
population size of more than 14 billion in 2100 and population growth does not seem to 
stop before having reached 15-16 billion in the 22nd century. Likewise, a rapid linear 
fertility decline to a TFR of only 1.4 children per women in the year 2025 for every 
region, Scenario 5 gives a totally different picture: After an increase to 8 billion in 2030- 
2040, population size may decline to a figure below 5 billion in the very long run (2100). 
Population size is, to a lesser extent, influenced by assumptions on mortality. In 
the medium term, a constant mortality level in conjunction with replacement fertility by 
2025, Scenario 7 would delay the growth in population size by some ten years as 
compared to the UN Medium assumptions on mortality improvements. In the very long 
run population size in the absence of mortality improvements tends lo level off at around 
7.5 billion, which is two billion below that in a corresponding scenario with increasing 
life expectancy. 
Delaying the assumed improvement in life expectancy by 25 years, Scenario 8 has 
virtually no impact on total population size. Assuming a rapid increase in life expectancy 
to 85 years for women and 80 years for men in all the regions in the year 2025, Scenario 
9 increases population size by one billion in 2050 and two billion in 2100. 
3.2. Regional Distribution 
It is safe to say that population growth will occur unevenly across our globe and 
result in major changes in the global population distribution. Currently, the world 
population is distributed over the continents as shown in Table 3: around or more than 
20 percent live in each Europe/North America/USSR, Southern Asia and Eastern Asia, 
around 10 percent live in each Africa, Latin America and Other AsialOceania. 
Due to present great differentials in fertility levels resulting in different age 
structures and therefore a differential momentum of growth, and due to the assumption 
that fertility changes will only be gradual, the populations of Africa and Southern Asia 
will grow fast whereas Eastern Asia and Europe will hardly grow. Consequently, all 
scenarios result in a change of regional population distributions, which in .the case of 
Scenario 2 might read as follows in 2050 (see Table 3): only 11 percent would live in 
Europe,North America and USSR, only 17 percent in Eastern Asia, but 22 percent in 
Africa. According to this UN Medium Variant Scenario, the total world population will 
double over the next 70 years: Africa will grow fourfold, while the industrialized world 
will keep its current size. 
However, Table 3 shows that the future population distribution might also be 
more extreme. The Constant Rates Scenario (1) even results in 25 percent Africans but 
only 7 percent Europeans/North Americans/Soviets by the year 2050, and hypothetical 
37 and 2 percent, respectively, in 2100. Aside from the unimaginable population increase 
in Africa it is also interesting to look at Asia: While there is about one Southern Asian 
to each Eastern Asian today, it will be two to one in 2100 according to Scenario 2, or 
even five to one according to Scenario 1. 
Avery extreme change in regional distributions is caused by the scenario assuming 
differential demographic developments between the regions. Scenario 10, assuming a 
crisis in Africa and Southern Asia resulting in higher mortality and constantly high 
fertility, but demographic stability in all other parts of the world, gives a distribution that 
is even more extreme than under Scenario 1: Despite increasing mortality in those 
regions, 80 percent of the world population would then live either in Africa or in 
Southern Asia, as compared to only 35 percent today. 
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Table 3. Regional population distribution according to selected scenarios. 
Scenarios that assume a fast or moderate convergence to replacement or sub- 
replacement fertility (Scenarios 5-9) by definition result in more moderate distributional 
changes. Between 10 percent (Scenario 6) and 19 percent (Scenario 9) would be 
Africans, the corresponding percentages for Europe/North America/USSR being 18 
percent and 11 percent, respectively. 
Africa Latin Eastern Southern 0th. Asia, Europe, 
America Asia Asia Oceania USA, USSR 
1990: 12% 9% 25% 23% 11% 20% 
2050: 
Scenario 1 25% 9% 14% 31% 14% 7% 
Scenario 2 22% 10% 17% 26% 13% 11% 
Scenario 5 17% 9% 21% 27% 13% 12% 
Scenario 9 18% 9% 20% 27% 13% 12% 
Scenario 10 25% 7% 16% 31% 10% 10% 
2100: 
Scenario 1 37% 8% 6% 33% 14% 2% 
Scenario 2 32% 11% 12% 24% 13% 9% 
Scenario 5 17% 10% 20% 28% 14% 12% 
Scenario 9 19% 10% 19% 28% 14% 11% 
Scenario 10 42% 4% 8% 38% 5% 4% 
3.3. Mean Age 
World 
Population 
5.29 
14.59 
9.89 
7.68 
10.69 
12.61 
39.31 
10.96 
4.29 
11.60 
26.93 
There is no doubt about the fact that the world population will be aging 
significantly in the future. Even the Constant Rates Scenario, which is very unlikely in 
the long run, gives an increase in the mean ages of all regions over the next 50 years. 
Scenario 2, based on the UN Medium Variant, will result in much more significant aging 
in all regions of the world. While in today's industrialized countries the mean age is 
expected to increase from the present 35 years to more than 43 years by 2070, extent and 
pace of aging will be even stronger in Eastern Asia. There, the UN Medium Variant 
expects an increase in the mean age from presently 29 years to 44 years by 2070. Even 
in Africa the mean age is expected to increase by more than 12 years to about the same 
level we find in Europe and North America today. 
As could be expected, the Rapid Fertility Decline Scenario (5), which is the only 
one that would ultimately bring down the world population below its present size, results 
in the most extreme aging of the world population. Under this scenario, in almost every 
continent the mean age of the population would reach about 50 years by the end of next 
century. What this means in terms of changes of the social and economic structure is 
hard to imagine, not to speak about medical expenses and retirement benefits. 
In summary, this comparison of the consequences of various scenarios on total 
population size and the age structure of the population makes clear the fundamental 
dilemma of future population trends under low mortality conditions. All scenarios that 
limit population growth even at a level two to three times of today's world population, 
will result in extreme aging of the population. Only further exponential growth of the 
population will keep the populations young. 
Put in simple words: Either the population explodes in size or it ages to an 
unprecedented extent. The explosion will sooner or later result in higher mortality levels 
because it cannot go on for ever, the aging makes painful social adjustment processes 
necessary and a complete remodelling of both family and state support systems for the 
elderly. Probably the future will bring a combination of both undesirable phenomena. 
4. DISCUSSION: THE LEVEL OF AGGREGATION 
At this point we do not want to enter a discussion on which scenario is more 
likely than another. This discussion together with a detailed evaluation of various 
assumptions on a regional level will be done elsewhere (see preface to this paper). Here 
we only wanted to stress one very important technical point, namely the dependence of 
the appearing pattern on the level of aggregation. 
In the discussion on global interactions between population growth, socio- 
economic development and the environment, statements are frequently made and 
compared which are based on different levels of regional aggregation. If the aggregates 
are heterogeneous, however, often serious discrepancies and contradictions arise. One 
example is that the projection of total future energy consumption by combining present 
per capita consumption with future population growth will result in much higher figures 
if it is done for the whole world as opposed to continents. The reason lies in the fact that 
today's per capita consumption is heavily influenced by the industrialized countries, 
whereas future population growth will take place in the Third World where per capita 
consumption is by magnitudes lower. 
One need not go to the question of population/environment interactions to 
encounter this question. The simple example of the Constant Rates Scenario from the 
analysis above shows that, if the projection is performed at the level of regions and 
aggregated thereafter, as is done in the above paper, the resulting population size figures 
in the more distant future are more than 50 percent higher as in the case where the 
same assumption of constant rates is applied to the world total. The reason for this 
difference by a factor of 1.5 lies in the simple fact that today the low fertility populations 
of the industrialized countries are still a higher proportion of the total world population 
than they will be in the future under all scenarios. Hence, applying a constant fertility 
rate to the world together with the inevitable change in weights actually implies declining 
fertility rates in the less developed countries. 
There is no easy answer to the question what is an appropriate level of 
aggregation. If we know, however, that there is significant heterogeneity within the 
aggregate considered, and the dynamics of the system will be influenced by it, and we 
even have data on smaller more homogeneous units, then it is hard to justify any study 
that does not consider explicitly those units. 
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APPENDIX TABLES: Numerical Results of Calculations by Scenario 
Scenario 1: Constant Rates 
AFRICA LATIN EASTERN SOUTHERN 0 T H . A S I A  EUROPE/ WORLD 
AMERICA A S I A  A S I A  OCEANIA USA/USSR TOTAL 
a. Total population (in billions) 
b. Population distribution (in %) 
c. Mean age of the population (in years) 
Scenario 2: UN Medium Variant 
AFRICA L A T I N  EASTERN SOUTHERN 
AMERICA A S I A  A S I A  
a. Total population (in billions) 
b. Population distribution (in % )  
c. Mean age of the population (in years) 
OTH . A S I A  
OCEANIA 
WORLD 
TOTAL 
Scenario 3: Constant Fertility 
AFRICA LATIN EASTERN SOUTHERN 0TH.ASIA EUROPE/ WORLD 
AMERICA ASIA ASIA OCEANIA USA/USSR TOTAL 
a. Total population (in billions) 
b. Population distribution (in % )  
c. Mean age of the population (in years) 
Scenario 4: Slow Fertility Decline 
AFRICA LATIN EASTERN SOUTHERN 0TH.ASIA EUROPE/ WORLD 
AMERICA ASIA ASIA OCEANIA USA/USSR TOTAL 
a. Total population (in billions) 
b. Population distribution (in % )  
c. Mean age of the population (in years) 
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Scenario 5: Rapid Fertility Decline 
AFRICA LATIN EASTERN SOUTHERN 0TH.ASIA EUROPE/ WORLD 
AMERICA ASIA ASIA OCEANIA USA/USSR TOTAL 
a. Total population (in billions) 
b. Population distribution (in % )  
c. Mean age of the population (in years) 
Scenario 6: Immediate Replacement Fertility 
AFRICA LATIN EASTERN SOUTHERN 0TH.ASIA EUROPE/ 
AMERICA ASIA ASIA OCEANIA USA/USSR 
a. Total population (in billions) 
b. Population distribution (in % )  
c. Mean age of the population (in years) 
WORLD 
TOTAL 
Scenario 7: Constant Mortality 
AFRICA LATIN EASTERN SOUTHERN 0TH.ASIA EUROPE/ WORLD 
AMERICA ASIA ASIA OCEANIA USA/USSR TOTAL 
a. Total population (in billions) 
b. Population distribution (in % )  
c. Mean age of the population (in years) 
Scenario 8: Slow Mortality Decline 
AFRICA LATIN EASTERN SOUTHERN 0TH.ASIA EUROPE/ 
AMERICA ASIA ASIA OCEANIA USA/USSR 
a. Total population (in billions) 
b. Population distribution (in % )  
c. Mean age of the population (in years) 
WORLD 
TOTAL 
Scenario 9: Rapid Mortality Decline 
AFRICA LATIN EASTERN SOUTHERN 0TH.ASIA EUROPE/ WORLD 
AMERICA ASIA ASIA OCEANIA USA/USSR TOTAL 
a. Total population (in billions) 
b. Population distribution (in % )  
c. Mean age of the population (in years) 
Scenario 10: Third World Crisis 
AFRICA LATIN EASTERN SOUTHERN 0TH.ASIA EUROPE/ WORLD 
AMERICA ASIA ASIA OCEANIA USA/USSR TOTAL 
a. Total population (in billions) 
b. Population distribution (in % )  
c. Mean age of the population (in years) 
